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Labor market regulations are invariably introduced with two objectives.
The ﬁrst one is to improve the welfare of the labor force, even at the cost of
introducing some degree of economic ineﬃciency. The second consists of
improving eﬃciency, when external factors and/or other labor market im-
perfections are present.
These regulations may eventually become inadequate due to an unsuit-
able original design or unexpected changes in the economic environment.
This inadequacy may lead to results contrary to the original goals of labor
market regulations. Consequently, as a general rule, labor market regula-
tions (as any other market regulation) need to be constantly evaluated and
updated if their original goals are to be preserved.
However, any empirical study of the impact of labor market regulations
on labor market performance faces three main diﬃculties. First, it is nec-
essary to face the facts that labor market regulations do not change very of-
ten and tend to apply universally to all sectors in the economy. Hence, vari-
ations in labor market regulations, which are necessary to identify their
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Second, even when legislation varies over time, it is diﬃcult to isolate its
impact on labor market performance from the impact of other macroeco-
nomic factors. This is particularly important in Brazil, because over the
past two decades macroeconomic instability has reached unprecedented
levels. Inﬂation, economic growth, internal and external imbalances, and
the degree of openness of the economy have changed considerably. If one
opts for using cross-section variations, the drawbacks are not less. In this
case, it is necessary to isolate the impact of diﬀerences in regulations from
all other sector-speciﬁc factors that could make performance measures
diﬀerent across sectors.
Finally, measures of labor market performance are needed. The problem
here is that performance is a multidimensional aspect of the labor market
with no consensus about its precise deﬁnition. Hence, there is not a single
unidimensional measure for this aspect. The use of the measure for the
(supposed) main dimension is usually implemented as a measure of labor
market performance.
In respect to the Brazilian labor market, many analysts have been very
critical about the beneﬁts of the prevailing labor market regulations.1 On
the whole, these regulations were designed to improve welfare, giving the
workers more protection. The analysts claim these regulations have not
been wisely designed and, consequently, are failing to reach their objective.
Actually their arguments go further, claiming that the regulation worsened
not only the welfare of the labor force, but also the eﬃciency, based on the
observation of increasingly poor working conditions and lower wages and
a drop in the degree of employability of the Brazilian labor force. They ar-
gue that this occurs in a new economic environment that increasingly re-
quires greater labor ﬂexibility. As a consequence, labor market regulation
reform has become a central item on the current Congress agenda, partic-
ularly after the recent leap in unemployment.2
Despite the importance of evaluations of the impact of these regulations
on labor market performance, the number of such studies focusing on
Brazilian labor markets has been very limited.3The three diﬃculties pointed
out are not suﬃcient to justify the relatively few studies on the subject. First,
labor market regulations underwent considerable changes in 1988, when 
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1. See Jatobá (1994) for a survey of those analyses that consider that a higher nonwage la-
bor cost reduces the job creation. This survey includes the arguments of Bacha, Mata, and
Modenesi (1972), Camargo and Amadeo (1990), Almeida (1992), Chahad (1993), Macedo
(1993), Pastore (1993), and World Bank (1991).
2. Deseasonalized unemployment in the six main Brazilian metropolitan regions increased
from around 5.7 percent in October 1997 to 7.4 percent in June 1998.
3. Some examples are Amadeo et al. (1995), Amadeo and Camargo (1993), Amadeo and
Camargo (1996), and Málaga (1992).a new constitution was enacted, containing most of the prevailing labor
market regulations. Moreover, the wealth of information available allows
the implementation of promising methodological possibilities for identify-
ing the impact of labor market regulations, based on alternative proxies
of labor market performance that can be obtained using the information
available.
Hence, the objective of this chapter is to identify whether the prevailing
Brazilian labor market regulations, in large extension originated by the 1988
constitutional change, have any impact on labor market performance. To
reach this objective we will explore alternative methodologies, sources of
information, and measures of labor market performance. The diversiﬁca-
tion is an attempt on accessing the robustness of our result.
We have two alternatives to measure labor market performance. The ﬁrst
is based on parameters estimated from a labor demand model, and the sec-
ond is based on turnover rates. Some alternative methodologies for estima-
tion of the eﬀect of the constitutional change are associated to each of these
two measures. Regression analysis is the only alternative developed for la-
bor demand parameters estimation. The turnover rates are mainly analyzed
through the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology, but regressions are also
developed as a complement of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method.
The chapter is organized in ﬁve sections, including this introduction. In
the next section we brieﬂy describe the 1988 constitutional change, with
special emphasis on the topics related to labor costs, which, basically, will
be used as the main sources of variation on labor market regulations. The
two sections that follow the institutional analysis will focus on the two al-
ternative measures of labor market performance. Section 5.3 is dedicated
to the description and implementation of the regression analysis through
which we estimate the parameters of labor demand. Section 5.4 contains
the description and results achieved when we use turnover rates to measure
labor market performance according to diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method-
ology complemented by regression analysis. Finally, section 5.5 summa-
rizes our main ﬁndings.
5.2 The Institutional Analysis
5.2.1 The 1988 Constitutional Change
A new Brazilian Constitution was enacted in 1988 as part of the process
of redemocratization in Brazil during the second half of the 1980s. Tradi-
tionally, Brazilian constitutions are very detailed, stipulating not only gen-
eral rules, but also many speciﬁc legal provisions. Most labor regulations,
for instance, are written in the constitution and are, consequently, very
diﬃcult to amend. The new constitution of 1988, in particular, consider-
Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance 275ably aﬀected labor regulations, causing changes in many labor codes that
had remained intact since the 1940s.4 Most of these changes, in tune with
the redemocratization environment, increased the degree of the workers’
protection.
These changes, shown in table 5.1, aﬀected both individual rights and
workers’ organizations. The new constitution gave more freedom and au-
tonomy to unions. The possibilities for government intervention in unions
were drastically reduced. In fact, many mechanisms of oﬃcial interference
were eliminated (e.g., the right of intervention by the Ministry of Labor
and the need to be registered and approved at the same Ministry) as well as
many restrictions of an institutional nature used to limit workers’ organi-
zations (such as representation scales and diversity of occupational cate-
gories). Many regulations on union management were also weakened, en-
suring more autonomy to unions during elections of their representatives
and in their decisions.
From the point of view of individual rights, we can perceive important
changes that increase variable labor costs and the level of dismissal penal-
ties. The increase in protection ensured by the new constitution consider-
ably increased a ﬁrm’s costs of employment. The maximum number of
working hours per week dropped from forty-eight to forty-four hours; the
maximum number of hours for a continuous work shift dropped from 
eight to six hours; the minimum overtime premium increased from 20 per-
cent to 50 percent; maternity leave increased from three to four months;
and the value of paid vacations increased from 1 to, at least, 4/3 of the nor-
mal monthly wage.
The new constitution also considerably increased the level of dismissal
penalties. This change in legislation will be one of the fundamental sources
of variation used throughout this study to estimate the impact of regula-
tions on labor market performance.
It is worth mentioning that the changes altered the level of the penalties
but not their nature. Traditionally, Brazilian legislation aﬀects the cost of
dismissal through two channels. First, employers must give notice to their
employees in the case of dismissal. Moreover, between the notice and ac-
tual dismissal, workers are granted two hours per day to look for a new job,
with no cut in wages. Second, the law states that all workers dismissed for
no just cause must receive monetary compensation paid by the employer.
Prior to the 1988 constitution, notice had to be given at least one month
in advance. The 1988 constitution states that the period of notice should be
given in proportion to the worker’s tenure. However, because no speciﬁc law
has ever regulated this constitutional device, notice continues to be given,
as before 1988, one month prior to dismissal for all workers, independent
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4. One major exception was the rule regulating dismissals, which suﬀered major changes in













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of their tenure. Hence, it cannot be used as our source of variation in labor
regulations.
Concerning the monetary compensation for dismissed workers, the law
states that a ﬁxed percentage of the Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço
(FGTS), a sort of job security fund accumulated while the worker was em-
ployed by the ﬁrm, is to be paid to every worker dismissed for no just cause.
There was a fourfold increase in the value of this penalty as a result of the
1988 constitutional change.
The basic characteristics of the FGTS are the following. First, each
worker in the formal sector has his own fund; in other words, it is a private
fund instead of a single fund for the workers as a group. Second, to build
the fund of each individual worker, the employer must contribute, every
month, the equivalent of 8 percent of his employee’s current monthly wage;
consequently, the accumulated FGTS of a worker in any given ﬁrm is pro-
portional to the worker’s tenure and his or her average wage over his or her
stay in the ﬁrm. Third, the fund is administrated by the government. Fourth,
workers have access to their own fund only if dismissed without just cause
or upon retirement.5 Fifth, if they resign they are notgranted access to this
fund. Sixth, on dismissal, workers have access to their entire fund, includ-
ing all funds accumulated in previous jobs, plus a penalty in proportion to
their accumulated fund in the job from which they are being dismissed.6
Before 1988, this compensation was equal to 10 percent of the cumula-
tive contribution of the current employer to the worker’s FGTS. After
1988, this penalty was increased to 40 percent of the employer’s cumulative
contribution to the worker’s FGTS. As the monthly rate is 8 percent of the
monthly wage, the FGTS accumulates at a rate of approximately one full
monthly salary per year in the job. So, quantitatively, the penalty accu-
mulates in a rate equivalent to 40 percent (10 percent prior to 1988) of the
worker’s current monthly wage per year in the ﬁrm. This compensation was
certainly very small prior to 1988. In fact, under the former constitution,
the worker had to be employed in the ﬁrm for at least ten years in order for
the compensation to reach the magnitude of one monthly salary. Now it
takes 2.5 years in the job for the compensation to reach this value.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that despite the 1988 fourfold increase in
the FGTS penalty it is not clear that, even now, this penalty constitutes a
major constraint to dismissals or even a major fraction of overall dismissal
costs. For instance, the cost of advance notice may be larger than the
penalty. In principle, the need for notice would increase the cost of dis-
missal only to the extent that, for a period of one month, 25 percent of the
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5. There are a few exceptions. Workers can use their FGTS as a part of the payment for ac-
quiring their home. They also can use it to pay for large health expenses.
6. The FGTS is a fund created by the military regime in 1966 to serve as an alternative to
the job security law prevailing at that time. In practice, all new contracts after 1966 adopted
the new system because it was preferred by both employees and employers.hours of the dismissed worker would be paid but not worked. In practice,
the productivity of a dismissed worker will drop once he or she has been
given notice, implying an overall decline of well over 25 percent in his or
her contribution to production. As a result, it is not uncommon for ﬁrms
to pay a full salary to dismissed workers, without their being required to
work a single hour. In other words, the cost of notice is actually between 25
percent and 100 percent of one month’s salary, being in practice closer to
100 percent than to 25 percent.
Consequently, the costs of advance notice tend to be higher than the dis-
missal compensation paid to all workers with tenure of less than 2.5 years.
Because most employment relationships in Brazil are short, employers may
be more sensitive to the cost of advance notice than to the value of the dis-
missal compensation.
5.2.2 Dismissal Penalties, Incentives, and 
Possible Labor Market Outcomes
As far as incentives are concerned, it is worth emphasizing that being
ﬁred is the chief mechanism to achieve access and control over their over-
all FGTS. Furthermore, there are strong incentives for workers to seek ac-
cess to their FGTS. First, the FGTS has been poorly managed by the gov-
ernment, typically generating negative real returns or returns well below
market rates.7 Second, due to shortsightedness or credit constraints, work-
ers may be heavily discounting the future. The facts that (1) all dismissal
penalties are immediately received individually by the dismissed worker,
and (2) being dismissed is the chief mechanism for workers to acquire con-
trol over their own fund that is poorly managed by the government give
them considerable incentives to induce their own dismissal after a certain
time in any job. However, those incentives are related to the existence of the
FGTS and the amount accumulated in this fund. As we saw in the last sec-
tion, the constitution did not change those aspects of regulation.
There are other incentives associated with the dismissal penalty that may
indeed drive the results estimated on this paper. On one hand this penalty
is paid by the employer to the employee, as opposed to the employer’s pay-
ing into a social fund held for all workers as a group. In other words, the
dismissed worker (only him) receives the penalty on an individual basis.
This characteristic of the law has well-established and major negative ef-
fects on the workers’ behavior, giving them signiﬁcant incentives to induce
their own dismissal.8
On the other hand, ﬁrm behavior tends, however, to reduce dismissals
when there is an increase on the dismissal’s penalties value. Additionally,
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7. See Almeida and Chautard (1976) for a broad analysis of the FGTS, including topics
such as management of the fund and workers’ welfare. Carvalho and Pinheiro (1999) provide
a more updated analysis, focusing on the role of FGTS on fomenting investments.
8. See Macedo (1985) and Amadeo and Camargo (1996).as a result of the increase in dismissal penalties, ﬁrms become more selec-
tive in their hiring procedures, leading to an overall decline even greater in
dismissal rates. Hence, the net eﬀect on turnover will depend on the re-
spective responses’ intensities of each part (ﬁrms and workers) to the mag-
nitude of the penalties. It is worth mentioning that these incentives are as-
sociated with employment spells longer than three months because before
that employers can ﬁre workers free of any penalty.
Hence, the aggregate eﬀect on turnover will depend also on the ﬁrm re-
action during the ﬁrst months of the relation, namely the training period.
The ﬁrm may become more selective in the ﬁrst three months because the
ﬁring process becomes more expensive later. It means that the turnover
may increase during this period as a consequence of an increase on dis-
missal penalties. So we have to contrast the results related to both periods
in order to access the aggregate result on turnover.
According to the incentives described previously, it is not clear that leg-
islation would achieve the original goal of a lower ﬁring level. We can ei-
ther have an opposite or null result. Additionally, a null net result can also
arise from the absence of any reaction. This would be the case if the penalty
is not a bidding constraint. In fact, we have some evidence that workers and
ﬁrms collude to turn voluntary quits into dismissals. Under this circum-
stance workers can have access to their fund, but ﬁrms do not pay any
penalty. Barros, Corseuil, and Foguel (2001) show that approximately 2/3
of the workers that voluntarily quit from jobs in the formal sector access
their FGTS, which means that these quits were oﬃcially registered as dis-
missals.9
5.3 Demand for Labor Estimation
This part of the chapter describes an attempt to estimate the impact of
regulations on labor market performance based on the ﬁrst of the two mea-
sures mentioned in the introduction—the labor demand parameters. These
parameters constitute our proxy for labor market performance. As we esti-
mate the parameters monthly, we can try to identify whether the evolution
of these parameters is associated to the constitutional change or to the evo-
lution of macroeconomic indicators. This exercise constitutes our second
step, where we run regressions of the labor demand parameters on an indi-
cator of the constitutional change and on macroeconomic indicators.
This part is organized in ﬁve sections. Section 5.3.1 describes a structural
model for labor demand on which we base our ﬁrst step. The estimation
procedure of the relation suggested by the theoretical model is described in
section 5.3.2. The second step and a data base description are the focus of
sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, while the results of both steps are commented on
in section 5.3.5.
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9. There are questions about access to the fund in some Brazilian household surveys.5.3.1 A Structural Model for Labor Demand
In this section we estimate a structural dynamic labor demand model us-
ing longitudinal data on establishments. The model, one of the most simple
in the literature, assumes labor as a homogeneous input and that labor is
the only input undergoing adjustment costs.10 Moreover, this basic theo-
retical model assumes that each ﬁrm i, at each point in time t, chooses the
level of employment, ni(t), in order to maximize the expected present value




 r{R[ni(t   r), pi(t   r),  (t   r),  i(t   r)] 
   (t   r)wi(t   r)ni(t   r)   C[ ni(t   r),  (t   r)]} ,
where R is the revenue function and C is the employment adjustment cost
function.
Hence, at each point in time the revenue function, R, can be obtained by
choosing the level of production and of all nonlabor variable inputs that
maximize a current proﬁts condition on a given choice for employment
and the state of the technology.11 As a consequence, the arguments of the
revenue function can be divided into three groups: (1) level of employment,
ni(t); (2) price of all other variable inputs relating to the product price, pi(t);
and (3) all factors determining the state of technology. We divide the fac-
tors determining the state of technology into two groups: (1) a vector of pa-
rameters deﬁning the overall form of technology at each point in time,  (t),
that is common to all ﬁrms; and (2) a certain ﬁrm and time-speciﬁc tech-
nological innovation,  i(t).
The second term in equation (1) is the direct cost of labor. In this equa-
tion, wi(t) is the real wage rate12 paid by ﬁrm i at time t, and  (t) is the ratio
between the overall variable cost of labor and the wage rate. We are im-
plicitly assuming that all nonwage variable costs are proportional to wages
with the proportionality constant and common to all ﬁrms but possibly
time varying due to changes in the legislation.
Finally, the cost of adjustment (C) is assumed to be a function of the net
change in employment,  ni(t)  ni(t) – ni(t– 1), and a parameter,  (t). This
parameter may vary over time to capture changes in the economic envi-
ronment and in the labor legislation, but it is common to all ﬁrms, indicat-
ing that all ﬁrms face the same adjustment cost.
According to this model, the form of technology and labor costs may
vary freely over time. However, idiosyncratic shocks of a ﬁrm can only
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10. See Nickell (1986), Hamermesh (1993), and Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for surveys
of dynamic labor demand models.
11. In the state of the technology, we include the impact of the level of all ﬁxed or exoge-
nously determined inputs.
12. The real wage rate is obtained by dividing the nominal wage rate by the product price.aﬀect technology. Labor costs are determined by ﬁrm-speciﬁc wages and a
legislation that is common to all ﬁrms.
In order to obtain an explicit solution to this problem of maximization,
we introduce a series of simplifying assumptions that allow us to write the
solution of equation (1) as the following expression deﬁned for the em-
ployment level:13






   11(t)    i(t)  ∑
m
s 1
ϕs(t)Iis    (t)wi(t) ,
where   is implicitly deﬁned by
 12  (1    )(1      ) ,
and Iisindicates whether ﬁrm ibelongs to sector s, that is, Iis 1 if ﬁrm ibe-
longs to sector s and Iis   0 otherwise. Finally,  11(t),  12(t) are originated
from  (t) and correspond to parameters of a quadratic revenue function,
the same assumption made for the adjustment cost function.
5.3.2 Econometric Speciﬁcation
To obtain an empirically feasible econometric speciﬁcation for the de-
mand for labor, we must be more speciﬁc about the ﬁrm- and time-speciﬁc
technological innovation,  i(t). We assume that this innovation consists of
three underlying components; that is, we assume that
 i(t)    i    (t)   Ui(t),
where  icaptures a ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-invariant technological component,
 (t) an aggregated time-speciﬁc technological shock, and Ui(t) captures all
other technological shocks. The presence of the ﬁrst two components al-
lows us to assume, without any loss of generality, that the average of Ui(t)
over time and across ﬁrms is always zero. However, because the economet-
ric model will also include sectorial indicators, Iis, we must assume that the
average of Ui(t) within each sector is also zero; that is, we assume that for
every s,
E[Ui(t)Iis   1]   0.
To identify the parameters of the model, additional assumptions are re-
quired. Probably the simplest route to obtain identiﬁcation is to assume that
Ui(t) is an exogenous moving-average process. Accordingly, we assume that
E[Ui(t)ni(t   p)]   0
for all p   k1. We also assume that although these technological shocks
may be correlated with the recent evolution wages, they are uncorrelated
with the evolution of wages in the past; that is,
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13. The complete derivation of the model is reported in appendix A.E[Ui(t)wi(t   p)]   0
for all p   k2. Notice that if U were an exogenous moving-average process
of order
k   max(k1, k2),
then these two assumptions would be immediately satisﬁed.
Given this speciﬁcation for the technological innovation, equation (2)
may be rewritten as




ϕs ∗(t)Iis    ∗(t)wi(t)    ni(t   1)   Ui∗(t),
where






 [ 11(t)    (t)],




























The presence of  (t) and  i∗in equation (3) poses some drawbacks for es-
timation. The presence of  (t) makes estimation of the other parameters
unfeasible in a pure time series context, unless some function form for  (t)
is imposed.
In a cross-section environment, the diﬃculty is imposed by the natural
correlation between  i∗ and ni(t – 1). To solve this problem we must rely on
longitudinal information. When this type of information is available, we
can take ﬁrst diﬀerences to obtain
(4)  ni(t)      (t)  ∑
m
s 1
 ϕs ∗(t)Iis    ∗(t) wi(t)      ni(t   1)    Ui∗(t),
as long as the ratio between the overall variable cost of labor and the wage
rate   (t) is time invariant. This equation has the advantage of eliminating
the idiosyncratic component  i∗. Nevertheless, it still cannot be estimated
as a multiple regression because
E[ ni(t   1) Ui∗(t)]   0.
However, it follows from the assumptions made previously about Ui(t)
that
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and
E[wi(t   p) Ui∗(t)]   0
for all p   k   1. Hence, the model can be estimated by instrumental vari-
able using past values of employment and wages as instruments. Under the
assumptions made on Ui(t), all values of employment and wages lagged at
least k   2 periods would be valid instruments. However, from a practical
point of view it is necessary to limit the number of instruments. In this
study we use as instruments 6 lags for employment and 6 lags for wages;
that is, we use as instruments employment and wages lagged, k   2, . . . ,
k   7 months. In the estimation we use two alternative values for k (one
month and ten months). Hence, to implement this econometric procedure
it is necessary to count with panel information at least seventeen months
long on ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment and wages.
Using this econometric model, based on equation (4), it is possible to es-
timate  (t),  ,  ∗, and ϕs(t). Changes on the values of these parameters, es-
pecially   and  ∗ after 1988, indicate that the regulation might have im-
pacted on labor market performance.14 One possibility for investigating
these possible changes would be to estimate two sets of parameters, ﬁrst us-
ing data from the years before 1988 and then data from recent years. The
available data allows us to obtain monthly estimates of the parameters of
the demand function.
This strategy has at least three advantages over the strategy of estimat-
ing just two models for a period before and after 1988. First, it is easier to
implement because the econometric model is essentially estimated in a
cross-section. This feature of the estimation procedure makes estimating
the standard errors much easier because in this case it is not necessary to
estimate the temporal correlation patterns of the technological shocks.
Second, the estimation of a model for every month has the great advan-
tage of allowing a precise identiﬁcation of the exact point in time where the
parameters have changed. A precise identiﬁcation of the moment when the
parameters changed can provide important insights into the question of
whether the constitutional change is the real force behind the changes in
the demand for labor. For instance, if the parameters began to change long
before or long after 1988, we would become suspicious about the causal
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14. At this point it is worthwhile mentioning that, although the demand for labor is esti-
mated for every month, in the estimation procedure the parameters  12,  , and   must be at
least locally time invariant. The estimated parameters are consistent only if this assumption
is valid. If the parameters  12 and   change over time, equation (2) would not be the solution
of the Euler equation. Moreover, if   varies from one month to the next, the ﬁrst diﬀerence
made to eliminate the ﬁrm-speciﬁc time invariant technological component,  i∗, would still
work but would generate a diﬀerent function form to be estimated because in this case  ∗
would not factor out.link between the 1988 constitutional change and those in the demand for
labor.
Third, and more important, monthly estimations of the parameters al-
low us to identify in which sense their evolutions are determined—by the
regulation (1988 constitutional change) or by the evolution of macroeco-
nomic indicators. This is precisely what we do in the second step of this re-
gression analysis.
In the next section we describe this second step in detail. It is worth men-
tioning that we can also obtain estimated values for coeﬃcients of interest
other than the ones mentioned previously. The ﬁrst of these other coeﬃ-
cients is the long-run impact of changes in wages on employment,  , that
can be obtained via







Other parameters of interest are the structural parameters of the pro-
duction function,  12, and of the cost function,  . Some additional infor-
mation is required to obtain estimated values for these parameters. In this
study, to recover these original parameters we assume that the discount
rate,  , and the ratio between the unit cost of labor and the wage,  , are
known and equal to 0.95 and 1.8, respectively. Given the knowledge of
these two parameters and estimates for   and  ∗, estimates for the under-
lying parameters  12 and   can be obtained via
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5.3.3 Identiﬁcation Strategy: The Second Step
The monthly estimate of demand functions was just the ﬁrst step in our
econometric strategy. Because the Brazilian economy underwent a process
of trade liberalization and was subject to a series of stabilization plans at
the same time as the change in the constitution, changes in the parameters
of the labor demand function that may have occurred over this period can-
not be immediately attributed to the constitutional change.
To isolate the eﬀect of the constitutional change on the parameters of the
demand function, we regress our monthly estimates of these parameters on
a temporal indicator for the 1988 constitutional change, Dt, controlling for
a variety of other macroeconomic indicators, Mt. Because the precision of
estimates varies considerably over time, to control for this source of varia-
tion we use as our dependent variable the parameter estimate divided by its
























    a2   b2D(t)   c2M(t)   e2(t),
where s (t) and s (t) are the standard errors of   ˆ (t) and   ˆ∗(t), and D(t)   0,
if t refers to a period prior to 1988 and D(t)   1 otherwise. We include the
following as macroeconomic indicators: (1) the GDP real growth rate;
(2) degree of openness measured by the ratio of total trade (exports plus
imports) to the GDP; (3) inﬂation rate; and (4) inﬂation volatility mea-
sured by the inﬂation standard deviation. Monthly dummies and a linear
trend were included in all regressions. These regressions are estimated by
ordinary least square method using monthly data covering the period June
1986 to December 1997. Positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimates for
b1 and b2 would then be taken as evidence that the 1988 constitutional
change had an important eﬀect on the demand for labor and, consequently,
on the level of employment and the speed of adjustment.
5.3.4 The Database
In the ﬁrst step of the regression analysis we estimate the demand for la-
bor using monthly longitudinal information from the Pesquisa Industrial
Mensal (PIM). The PIM is a monthly industrial establishment survey con-
ducted by the IBGE (Brazilian Census Bureau), covering the entire coun-
try. It is a longitudinal survey of a stratiﬁed sample of approximately 5,000
manufacturing establishments employing ﬁve workers or more. The panel
covers the period from January 1985 to the present.
The survey collects information on labor inputs, labor costs, turnover,
the value of production, and so on. The data on labor inputs includes both
employment and the total number of hours paid. The survey has three ma-
jor limitations in terms of measuring labor inputs. First, the information
covers the total number of hours paid but not the actual number of hours
worked. Second, all data refers only to the personnel directly involved in
production. Finally, there is no information on the qualiﬁcation of the la-
bor force employed.
In relation to labor costs, two types of information are available: (1) to-
tal value of contractual wages (that is, value of wages and salaries as spec-
iﬁed in labor contracts), and (2) total value of payroll. For the purposes of
this study, the payroll data seems to be more informative because it includes,
in addition to contractual wages, the payment for overtime, commissions,
and other incentive schemes, such as a productivity premium. It also in-
286 Ricardo Paes de Barros and Carlos Henrique Corseuilcludes all fringe beneﬁts; paid vacations; and any additional payments for
hazardous activities, night shifts, and other compensating schemes.15
Despite the fact that the payroll data covers a wide variety of labor costs,
it does not include all of them. Major exceptions are the employer’s con-
tributions to social security, training programs, and other social programs.
Fortunately, however, these contributions as fractions of contractual wages
have been fairly constant over time, except for a signiﬁcant change for the
occasion of the 1988 constitution.
Hence, for each establishment in the survey we use essentially three
pieces of information: (1) employment level, (2) total number of hours
paid, and (3) total payroll. Basing our information on these three variables
we construct two measures for variable labor cost. These two measures are
obtained by dividing total payroll by the level of employment and the total
number of hours paid, respectively. For labor input we use both available
measures: employment and hours paid. As a result, each demand model is
actually estimated twice, depending on whether labor inputs are measured
by employment or hours paid. We will refer to the one based on employ-
ment level as model 1 and to the one based on hours paid as model 2.
In the ﬁrst step of the regression analysis we aggregate some macroeco-
nomic indicators mentioned in the last section. The source of the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) data is the IBGE. The data for exports and imports
was calculated in joint work by the Fundação Centro de Estudos de
Comércio Exterior (FUNCEX) and IPEA. Finally, we used the oﬃcial in-
ﬂation index to measure inﬂation.
Before we move to the labor demand estimates, we present some basic
statistics from our sample of establishments. Panels A and B of ﬁgure 5.1
present the monthly evolution of the average level of the two measures of
labor input used in the study. These ﬁgures reveal that ﬁrms in our sample
employ 200 to 300 workers who are paid a total of 45,000 to 70,000 hours
per month during the period analyzed. The average number of hours paid
per month per worker in our sample is around 230 hours. Notice that a
fraction of the hours paid is not actually worked. For instance, included in
the hours paid is at least one day oﬀ per week (usually Sunday), which is
paid but not worked.
All these ﬁgures reveal that, over the 1985–1997 period, employment
and hours paid per manufacturing ﬁrm declined considerably, with the to-
tal decline concentrated in the ﬁrst two years of the 1990s. The main goal
of this study is to determine precisely to what extent this decline can be as-
sociated with the 1988 constitutional change or with other macroeconomic
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15. In this study, all information on contractual wages and payroll has been deﬂated using
the sector’s speciﬁc wholesale price index, except for the pharmaceutical; plastic; textile; and









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.changes that marked the performance of the Brazilian economy over this
period.
Panels C and D of ﬁgure 5.1 show the monthly evolution of our two mea-
sures for labor costs. These ﬁgures reveal that average wages (in Brazilian
reais [R]) for production workers in Brazilian manufacturing were, most of
the time, between R$600 and R$800 per month, leading to an hourly wage
rate between R$2.50 and R$3.50.16 These ﬁgures reveal an overall upward
trend in wages over the period, coupled with at least four cyclical ﬂuctua-
tions. These cycles very closely match series of stabilization plans that
marked the period 1985–1994; see panel E of ﬁgure 5.1.
5.3.5 Empirical Results
The 1988 constitutional change brought an increase in labor costs, ﬁring
costs in particular. To the extent that this change was of substantial im-
portance, it would lead to a decline in the response of employment to
wages,  ∗and  , and also in the speed of adjustment (i.e., an increase in the
coeﬃcient on lag employment,  ).
We estimate labor demand models for each month from June 1986 to
December 1997. Although we have information since January 1985, the
need for valid instruments determines that parameter estimates could only
be obtained from mid-1986, that is, seventeen months after the actual
sample information begins.
As already mentioned in the previous sections, two labor demand mod-
els were estimated, depending on the choices of measures for labor inputs.
Moreover, two estimates are obtained for each model, depending on how
far in the past we select the instruments. In total, four estimates for the la-
bor demand function are obtained. In each case we directly estimate two
basic parameters: (1) the coeﬃcient on lag employment,  ; and (2) the co-
eﬃcient on current wages,  ∗. We also obtain estimates for the long-run
impact of change in wages on employment ( ) and other structural pa-
rameters ( 12 and  ).
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 provide estimates of the monthly evolution of the
short-run impact of changes in wages on employment,  t ∗. Figures 5.4 and
5.5 show corresponding estimates for the coeﬃcient on lag employment,
 t. Because the estimates vary considerably from month to month, we also
compute a trimmed twelve-month moving average. We adopted a two-step
procedure to calculate this moving average. First, we eliminate all values in
the lowest and highest tenths of the distribution.17Second, we calculate the
twelve-month moving averages with the remaining estimates. The averages
are weighted, using the inverse of the standard errors of each estimate as
weights. Basing our information on these moving average estimates for the
Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance 293
16. The exchange rate was 1.11 R$/US$ in December of 1997.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)basic parameters of the model ( tand  t ∗), we obtain estimates for the long-
run eﬀect of wages on employment,  t. These estimates are presented in
ﬁgures 5.6 and 5.7.
Basing our information on two-year averages of the temporal evolution
of these parameters and the values chosen for   and  , we obtain estimates
for some important remaining structural parameters of the model:  12 and
 . These estimates are presented in ﬁgures 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11.
Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, and 5.7 provide clear evidence that both employ-
ment and hours paid decline as labor costs rise. These ﬁgures, however,
provide no clear evidence that either the short- or long-run response of em-
ployment to labor costs increased as a consequence of the 1988 constitu-
tional change.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 give no evidence that the speed of adjustment was
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the 1988 constitutional change. In fact, ﬁgures 5.4
and 5.5 reveal a modest continuous increase in the speed of adjustment,
contrary to what would be expected from a discrete increase in ﬁring costs.
It is worth mentioning, however, that the estimates for   have the correct
signed and are statistically signiﬁcant, at least when we use the number of
employed workers as a measure of the labor input. These estimates, how-
ever, are considerably smaller (estimates for   are around 0.5) than what is
commonly obtained from time series studies. Although the same pattern is
observed when we use the number of hours paid, some point estimates be-
came negative, and it becomes considerably less precise. Finally, ﬁgures 5.4
and 5.5 reveal that, as we choose instruments further into the past (i.e., as
k increases), the estimated values for   declines, indicating that serial cor-
relation among technological shocks may seriously bias   upwards.
The interpretation of the basic parameters would be much easier if all
variables were in logs. The speciﬁcation with all variables in logs is also
more similar, related to the tradition in labor demand models. For these
reasons, we reestimate all previous models, changing all variables from lev-
els to logs. Figures 5.12 to 5.17 show that the main results are robust to the
log speciﬁcation.
As in the basic model, these ﬁgures provide no clear evidence that the
1988 constitutional change had any signiﬁcant impact on either the mag-
nitude or the speed of the response of labor inputs to labor costs. These ﬁg-
ures deserve a few additional comments. First, they show that the short-
and long-term wage elasticities are around –0.2 and –0.4, respectively.
Second, it is worth mentioning that the estimates for the coeﬃcient on lag
of employment remain very close to 0.5, as is the case in the basic model.
Third, it should be noted that the further the instruments are in the past,
the smaller the estimated coeﬃcients on lag employment, another pattern
common to the basic model.
To summarize the evidence about the eﬀect of the 1988 constitutional


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.change on labor demand, we regress18monthly estimates of the parameters
  and  ∗ on an indicator for the constitutional change and control for a set
of basic macroeconomic variables. These regressions also include monthly
dummies and a linear trend. The results are presented in tables 5.2 and 5.3.
If the constitutional change actually increases labor costs and, as a con-
sequence, has an important eﬀect on the demand for labor, then the esti-
mated coeﬃcients for the indicator of constitutional change would be posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant in the regressions involving both parameters.
This would be the case because an increase in variable labor costs would in-
crease   and hence  ∗, whereas an increase in ﬁring costs would increase
the cost of adjustment and reduce the speed of adjustment leading to an in-
crease in  .
Contrary to these expected results, in the regressions presented in tables
5.2 and 5.3 we found no evidence indicating that the 1988 constitution
change had any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the labor demand function. All esti-
mates of the constitution indicator coeﬃcient are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, despite the regression R2 reach values close to 0.4.
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18. As demonstrated in section 5.3.3, in these regressions we used as our dependent vari-
able the parameter estimate divided by its corresponding standard error. Our purpose was to
reduce the inﬂuence of outliers. If the standard error was inﬂuenced by the constitutional
changes, this procedure would generate biased estimates. But, as this is not the case, estimates
extracted from these same regressions, considering only the parameter as a dependent vari-
able, leads us to the same conclusion about the lack of importance of constitutional changes
for the level of the parameter.
Table 5.2 Regression Results (k   1)
Dependent Variable
Lagged Employment ( ) Labor Cost ( ∗)
Coeﬃcient P-value (%) Coeﬃcient P-value (%)
Model 1
Indicator for the constitutional change –1.542 77.1 –1.861 58.3
GDP growth rate –0.081 84.0 –0.069 78.8
Degree of openness 8.617 22.5 –3.998 37.9
Inﬂation rate 11.377 29.1 –8.461 22.1
Inﬂation volatility 2.491 15.6 1.460 19.4
Adjusted R2 0.358 0.026
Model 2
Indicator for the constitutional change –5.578 39.3 2.320 43.3
GDP growth rate 0.743 13.6 –0.177 43.2
Degree of openness –1.499 86.4 –2.111 59.4
Inﬂation rate 20.985 11.5 9.474 11.7
Inﬂation volatility –0.329 87.9 –0.807 41.0
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.0655.4 The Turnover Analysis
This part of the chapter describes an attempt to estimate the impact of
regulations on labor market performance based on turnover measures. We
ﬁrst investigate if these measures were aﬀected by the constitution using a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology, described in section 5.4.1. The pre-
cise deﬁnition of the turnover measures that we make use of, as well as the
description about how to implement these measures based on the available
database, are presented in section 5.4.2. The results are commented on in
section 5.4.3. Section 5.4.4 discusses some controversial issues in diﬀer-
ence-in-diﬀerences methodology that motivates a regression analysis de-
veloped in section 5.4.5 with two objectives. These regressions test some
hypotheses of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology and access the
robustness of the previous results.
5.4.1 The Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Methodology
According to this methodology, we began by breaking down the overall
population into two groups, the so-called treatment and control groups. If
this partition attends some conditions, the evolution of the performance
for the control group would indicate what would have happened to the
treatment group if the 1988 constitutional change had not occurred. Hence,
the contrast of the evolution of both performances (that is a diﬀerence of
the previous diﬀerences) correspond to the estimation of the impact of the
regulation on the performance of the treatment group.
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Table 5.3 Regression Results (k   10)
Dependent Variable
Lagged Employment ( ) Labor Cost ( ∗)
Coeﬃcient P-value (%) Coeﬃcient P-value (%)
Model 1
Indicator for the constitutional change 10.597 77.1 –3.750 58.3
GDP growth rate 0.049 84.0 –0.248 78.8
Degree of openness –5.272 22.5 1.961 37.9
Inﬂation rate –8.950 29.1 –5.417 22.1
Inﬂation volatility –2.192 15.6 0.849 19.4
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.057
Model 2
Indicator for the constitutional change –3.242 39.3 1.526 43.3
GDP growth rate 0.247 13.6 –0.030 43.2
Degree of openness 3.200 86.4 –7.195 59.4
Inﬂation rate 16.996 11.5 14.988 11.7
Inﬂation volatility –0.701 87.9 1.363 41.0
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.133Ideally, the treatment group would be the group most aﬀected by the
change in legislation. The control group, on the other hand, ideally must
have two properties. First, contrary to the treatment group, it should not
be aﬀected at all by the change in legislation. Second, the impact of the
underlying macroeconomic changes on the treatment and control groups
must be very similar.
To implement this methodology, we use three alternative ways to break
down the population in treatment and control groups.
Quits Versus Layoﬀs
Data regarding the informal sector is not always available. This is par-
ticularly the case when administrative ﬁles are used. Hence, it is important
to identify other sources of cross-section variation in the legislation. The
dichotomy between quits and layoﬀs is one possibility.
In general, regulations involving quits are totally diﬀerent from those
regulating dismissals. In Brazil, quits remain essentially unregulated, while
a considerable amount of legislation was designed to restrict dismissals
without just cause. Moreover, the changes brought by the new constitution
are entirely related to dismissals. They are silent with respect to quits.
Hence, quits and layoﬀs correspond to our second alternative for the par-
tition between treatment and control groups.
Short Versus Long Employment Spells
According to the new and previous constitutions, the entire regulation
on dismissals without just cause only applies to employment spells that
have lasted at least three months. Dismissals of workers that have not yet
completed three months on the job have been and still are completely un-
regulated. Hence, an alternative partition in treatment and control groups
can be achieved through the contrast between very short spells (control)
and other employment spells (treatment), where we consider as very short
spells all those that last less than three months.
Formal-Informal Dichotomy
According to the Brazilian labor laws all workers must have a document
named carteira de trabalho. This document, which resembles a little note-
book or passport, acts as a complete record of the main parameters of the
worker’s current, and all previous, formal labor contracts. In principle,
whenever a worker’s labor contract is modiﬁed, either by moving to a new
job or by renegotiating his contract with his current employer, the main
parameters of the new contract must be immediately transcribed to the
worker’s carteira de trabalho.
The existence of this document permits an easy empirical separation of
workers with formal labor contracts that must comply with the labor laws
from workers with informal labor contracts that are not under this legisla-
Impact of Regulations on Brazilian Labor Market Performance 329tion. Workers with formal labor contracts are all employees who have the
terms of their current labor contract transcribed to their carteira de tra-
balho. Those whose employers have not registered their labor contract in
their carteira de trabalho should be considered informal.
This clear conceptual dichotomy would be of little practical relevance if
the Brazilian employment surveys did not empirically investigate this ques-
tion. Fortunately, however, essentially all household and employment sur-
veys in Brazil do ask each employee in the sample whether their current
labor contract is registered in their carteira de trabalho. As a result, it is
possible and easy to separate empirically the pool of employees according
to whether they have or do not have a formal (registered in their carteira de
trabalho) labor contract. Moreover, this dichotomy is of the utmost im-
portance, because around 25 percent of the urban occupied labor force is
employed without a formal labor contract. So the formal and informal par-
tition of the worker population corresponds to our ﬁrst alternative of treat-
ment (formal) and control (informal) groups.
5.4.2 Measuring Turnover Rates
Conceptual Preliminaries
As an indicator of turnover we use the probability that the employment
spell will be terminated next month, conditional on its current duration.
This probability as a function of the current duration of the spell is com-
monly referred as the hazard function. Evidently, in this case the indica-
tor—the hazard function—is inversely related to the duration of employ-
ment.
The hazard function is usually preferred to its complement, the proba-
bility that it will not be terminated next month, conditional on its current
duration. In part, this preference derives from the fact that it can be bro-
ken down according to the nature of the separation. In fact, if an employ-
ment spell can only be terminated by a quit or dismissal, then the hazard
function is equal to the sum of the probability that the employment spell
will be terminated by a quit and the corresponding probability that it will
be terminated by a dismissal, where both probabilities are conditional on
the current duration of the spell. The probability that an employment spell
will be terminated by a quit (dismissal), conditional on its current dura-
tion, is commonly referred to as the transition intensity function.Hence, the
property just stated can be summarized by saying that the hazard equals to
the sum of the transition intensities.
To deﬁne these measures precisely, some symbols must be introduced
ﬁrst. Accordingly, let  t be the universe of all active employment relation-
ships at time t, and for each   in  t, let Dt( ) denote the incomplete dura-
tion of the relationship   up to time t. Moreover, let St( ) denote an indi-
cator of whether (S 1) or not (S 0) the relationship  will be terminated
330 Ricardo Paes de Barros and Carlos Henrique Corseuilin the month beginning at time t. The hazard rate, ht(d), is then deﬁned as
the probability that an active employment relationship, which up to time t
has already lasted d months, will be terminated next month, that is,
ht(d)   P(St   1Dt   d).
Moreover, let Qt( ) and Lt( ) be indicators of whether the relationship
  will be terminated next month by a quit or a dismissal, respectively. The
quit and dismissal transition intensities can be expressed, respectively, by
ht
q(d)   P(Qt   1Dt   d)
and
hl
t(d)   P(Lt   1Dt   d).
If a separation can only occur due to a quit or a dismissal, then
ht(d)   ht
q(d)   hl
t(d).
These equations refer to the probability of separation for employment
spells of a given duration in months. In practice, however, it is more con-
venient to use the probability of separation for all employment spells with
the duration in any given interval.19 For instance, it may be more conven-
ient to analyze the probability of separations of employment spells that
have already lasted six months but have not yet completed one year than
the probability of separation of employment spells that have lasted up to
now exactly seven months. Fortunately, the above equations can easily be
adapted to deﬁne the probability of separations for all employment spells
with the duration in any given interval. Resuming, we refer to these prob-
abilities as the aggregated hazard and transition intensity rates.
To deﬁne them precisely, let {ai : i   1, . . . , z} be a partition of N   {0,
1, . . .}, so that
ai   {di, . . . , di 1}
for all i   1, . . . , z, 0   d1   d2   ...     dz, and az   {dz, dz 1, . . .}. More-
over, let Hti denote the probability that an active employment relationship
that up to time t has already lasted between di and di 1 months will be ter-
minated next month. Then Hti is given by
Hti   P(St   1di   Dt   di 1)   P(St   1Dt ∈ ai).
By analogy we can deﬁne the corresponding transition intensities, respec-
tively, by
(7) Hq
ti   P(Qt   1di   Dt   di 1)   P(Qt   1Dt ∈ ai)
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19. Conceptually, d should refer to an instantaneous measure of time. In this sense the use
of month is already a simpliﬁcation for practical purposes.and
Hl
ti   P(Lt   1di   Dt   di 1)   P(Lt   1Dt ∈ ai).
In this study we divide employment spells according to their duration in
four intervals; that is, we consider the case n   5. These ﬁve intervals are
determined by choosing d1   0, d2   3, d3   6, d4   12, d5   24. Hence,
spells in the ﬁrst interval are those that have not yet lasted three months.
To simplify the exposition, we refer to them as the very-short spells. The
second interval consists of all spells that have already lasted at least three
months but have not yet reached six months. Spells in this interval are re-
ferred to as the short spells. The third interval is made of all spells that have
already lasted at least six months but have not yet reached one year. Spells
in this interval are referred to as the not-so-short spells. The fourth inter-
val is made of all spells that have already lasted at least one year but have
not yet reached two years. We are going to refer to them as the long spells.
Finally, the ﬁfth interval is made of all spells that have already lasted at
least two years. We are going to refer to them as the very-long spells.
To  obtain estimates for hazard and transition intensities we combine
three distinct data sets: the Relação Annual de Informações Sociais (RAIS),
the Cadastro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados (CAGED), and the
Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME). The PME is a monthly employment
survey, while RAIS and CAGED are administrative ﬁles.20 Three alterna-
tive empirical procedures are pursued to obtain consistent estimates of the
temporal evolution of these probabilities from these data sets. First, two
combine data from RAIS and CAGED, while the other relies exclusively
on PME data. The data used as well as the nature of the hypothesis neces-
sary to obtain consistent estimators vary considerably between these four
procedures. We describe each one of the three empirical procedures in turn
in the next subsection.
Measures for Hazard and Transition Intensities
Our ﬁrst procedure to estimate the transition probabilities consists of us-
ing the information from RAIS on the stock of active employment rela-
tionships classiﬁed by their incomplete duration up to time t, December 31
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20. The Relação Annual de Informações Sociais(RAIS) is an annual administrative ﬁle that
provides, at December 31 every year, a complete list of all active employment relationships in
the formal sector. The ﬁle also includes extensive characteristics of workers and ﬁrms. One of
the characteristics available for every worker in the ﬁle is how long he has been in the current
job, that is, the worker’s tenure. Hence, based on this information, it is possible to estimate the
distribution of active employment relationships according to their incomplete duration up to
December 31 of each year. The RAIS is available for all years from 1985 to 1996. The Cadas-
tro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados(CAGED) is a monthly administrative ﬁle that pro-
vides data on the formal sector of all separations that occurred in a given month. This ﬁle also
includes information about the nature of the separation and basic information on workers
and ﬁrms. In particular, it is possible to identify in each separation the reason for the separa-
tion (quits versus dismissals) and the complete duration of the employment spell.of a given year, and from CAGED on (1) how many of these active em-
ployment relationships are terminated in January of the following year;
(2)how many are terminated by quits; and (3) how many are terminated by
dismissals. The number of active employment relationships that at time t
has already lasted d months is represented by Nt(d), while the number cor-
respondent to those terminated in January by Mt(d). Those terminated by
quits are represented by Mt
q(d), and, ﬁnally, those terminated by dismissals
by Ml
t(d). More speciﬁcally, we have
Nt(d)   #(  in  tD( )   d)
Mt(d)   #(  in  tD( )   d and S( )   1)
Mt
q(d)   #(  in  tD( )   d and Q( )   1)
and
Ml
t(d)   #(  in  tD( )   d and L( )   1).
Basing our information on this, we obtain the hazard and the transition
intensity functions for each year via






































These expressions provide a useful method for estimating the probabil-
ity of separations of employment spells during some months. Due to the
nature of the available data, t is always December 31 for any given year.
Consequently, the month beginning at t is always January of the following
year. Hence, all estimates will refer to the probability that a separation will
occur in January, conditional on the duration of employment spells up to
December 31. Therefore, even though we label these estimates by the year
associated with time t, they do not reﬂect the average for this year. Actu-
ally, the estimates refer to January of the following years. Estimates for the
aggregated hazard and transition intensities can also be obtained by
Hti   ,
Hq
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(8) Hl
ti   .
Combining data from CAGED and RAIS it is possible to estimate all
these transition probabilities for each year between 1986 and 1995.
As already mentioned, these estimates described previously refer only to
transitions taking place in January. Because these probabilities may follow
a seasonal pattern during the year, it is important to verify to what extent
our conclusions are sensitive to the choice of a reference month. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot precisely compute these transition probabilities for each
month because we only have data for the stock at December 31. Neverthe-
less, an approximation of the average over the year can be obtained. In fact,
because ﬂows are observed for all months, we can combine the average
monthly ﬂow for the year with the stock at December 31 in order to obtain
an approximation for average monthly transition probabilities for the year.
Estimates of the aggregated hazard rate can be obtained by
H  ti   .
Once more combining data from CAGED and RAIS, it is possible to es-
timate all these transition probabilities for each year between 1986 and
1995.
We can also use data from PME to estimate transition probabilities for
the formal and informal sectors. PME is a typical employment survey cov-
ering the six major Brazilian metropolitan areas. For this study we use
monthly data from this survey covering the period 1982–1997. The impor-
tant feature of this survey is the fact that it has information on the complete
duration of previous employment spells for those currently unemployed. The
survey also has information on whether these employment spells ended as
quits or layoﬀs.
To obtain estimates for the hazard and transition intensities out of em-
ployment from this data source, we have to assume, in addition to the
steady state hypothesis, that the duration of employment and unemploy-
ment spells are stochastically independent. In this case, we can show (see
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334 Ricardo Paes de Barros and Carlos Henrique Corseuilwhere Ut(s) deﬁnes the number of unemployed workers at time twhose pre-
vious job lasted a period contained in the interval denoted by s. Similar
equations help estimate the aggregated transition intensities.
5.4.3 Empirical Results
To implement the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology we must specify
a period before and after 1988. For a pre-1988 period we use the years 1986–
1987. The choice of a post-1988 period is more diﬃcult. We would like to
pick a period as close to 1988 as possible. On one hand, this choice would
be useful to isolate the eﬀect of the drastic change in the constitution from
the impact of other concomitant macroeconomic changes that occurred
spread out over time. In other words, the closer the pre- and post-1988 pe-
riods, the better for separating the impact of the constitutional change from
the impact of changes in the macroeconomic environment. On the other
hand, because the eﬀects of the 1988 constitutional change may also be
spread out over time, capturing a signiﬁcant portion of them would be
necessary to use them for a post-1988 period, a time not very close to 1988.
In the latter case, however, there would be no guarantee that the effect of
changes in the macroeconomic environment was properly separated. By
virtue of this trade-oﬀ, we choose the years 1991–1992 to represent the post-
1988 period.
Estimates of the contrast between the aggregate hazard rates related to
these two periods are given in table 5.4. The estimates in this table indicate
that the hazard rate, mainly for short spells, dropped considerably just af-
ter the constitutional change. The values stay around 2 percentage points
for this group.
Because the underlying macroeconomic environment did not remain
constant over this period, this ﬁnding should be taken with caution. In or-
der to achieve a more precise result, we have to contrast the temporal diﬀer-
ence of the hazard rates associated with the treatment and control groups.
To describe the methodology more explicitly, let Y r
0 and Y r
1 be an indi-
cator of the duration of employment for the treatment group before and af-
ter the constitutional change, respectively. Moreover, let Yc
0 and Yc
1 be the
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Table 5.4 First Diﬀerences of Hazard Rates: (1991/92)–(1986/87)
1/4–1/2 year 1/2–1 year 1–2 years
Administrative ﬁles
Rais and caged (January ﬂows) –2.7 –0.3 –0.3
Rais and caged (average ﬂows) –2.0 –0.5 –0.2
Employment survey
Formal –1.7 –0.7 –0.1
Informal –0.8 –0.3 0.0
Sources: Based on the RAIS, CAGED, and PME.corresponding indicator of the duration of employment for the control
group before and after the constitutional change, respectively. In the latter
case, the impact of the constitutional change on the treatment group will
be estimated by the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator,  , given by
  (Y r
1   Y r
0)   (Yc
1   Yc
0).
To implement this methodology, we use three alternative ways to break-
down the population in treatment and control groups. First, we use infor-
mal workers as the control group and formal workers as the treatment
group. Second, we divide job separations into quits and dismissals. In this
case, quits form the control group and dismissals the treatment group. Fi-
nally, we use the very-short spells as a control group.
The decision about when to use each of these alternative control and
treatment groups was ﬁnally totally guided by data availability. In fact, we
use every alternative that the available data permitted us to use.
When quits are used as controls, the equation for this estimator is simpler.
To arrive at this result, we should ﬁrst notice that the response of quits to
macroeconomic changes behaves contrary to dismissals. In fact, as the
economy moves into a recession, layoﬀs will increase while quits fall.
Hence, when taking diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences we should change the sign of
the ﬁrst diﬀerence in quits before taking the second diﬀerence. More specif-
ically, in this case the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator,  , is given by
  (Yl
1   Yl
0)   (Yq




1   Yq
1)   (Yl
0   Yq
0)
because, in general, Yl
1   Yq
1   Y1 and Yl
0   Yq
0   Y0, where Y0 and Y1 are
the corresponding indicator for all separations before and after the consti-
tutional change, respectively. It follows that in this case   Y1 – Y0, which
is the simple diﬀerence estimator investigated in the previous section. In
other words, all results presented in table 5.4 could be interpreted as being
obtained from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator that use quits as a
control group.
Table 5.5 presents diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates for the impact of
the constitutional change on employment duration, using the informal sec-
tor and very-short spells as control groups.
When the informal sector is used as a control, at least for short spells, the
estimated impact of the constitutional change on the duration of employ-
ment is still negative and appreciable. The hazard rate for short spells de-
clined in both the formal and informal sector from before to after the con-
stitutional change, but the decline was 1 percentage point larger in the
formal sector.
Table 5.5 also presents estimates using very-short spells as a control
336 Ricardo Paes de Barros and Carlos Henrique Corseuilgroup. The decline in the hazard rate for very-short spells was 0.5 to 1.5
percentage point smaller than for short spells. However, when we compare
the evolution of the hazard rates for very-short spells with groups other
than the short spells, we have opposite results with similar magnitude; that
is, the hazard rates for other spells were .5 to 1.5 percentage point smaller
than for very-short spells.
So the results seem to be easier to analyze by employment spell. We have
evidence that the hazard rates declined for short spell according to any of
the three deﬁnitions implemented for the control group. No other employ-
ment spells reported such a consistent pattern for hazard rates.
5.4.4 Some Limitations of the Methodology
Although changes in the legislation would not have a direct eﬀect on
these control groups (one of the necessary conditions that the partition be-
tween treatment and control has to attend), it is very likely that they would
be indirectly aﬀected by the constitutional change. In section 5.2.2 we men-
tion two mechanisms through which the constitution may aﬀect quitting
behavior and the turnover among very-short duration spells. First, it is ar-
gued that increases in dismissal penalties are likely to reduce quits as some
workers prefer to wait or even to force their dismissal in order to collect the
compensation, whereas according to the second argument, ﬁrms may in-
crease the dismissal of employees before they complete three months on
the job in order to avoid the payment of dismissal penalties later.
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Table 5.5 Diﬀerences-in-Diﬀerences of Hazard Rates: Treatment–Control
Database Dismissal–Quit Other Spells–Very Short Spell Formal–Informal
Rais and caged 
(January ﬂows)
0–1/4 year –1.8 — —
1/4–1/2 year –2.7 –0.9 —
1/2–1 year –0.3 1.5 —
1–2 years –0.3 1.5 —
Rais and caged 
(average ﬂows)
0–1/4 year –0.8 — —
1/4–1/2 year –2.0 –1.2 —
1/2–1 year –0.5 0.3 —
1–2 years –0.2 0.6 —
PME
0–1/4 year –1.3 — 0.2
1/4–1/2 year –1.7 –0.5 –0.9
1/2–1 year –0.7 0.6 –0.4
1–2 years –0.1 1.2 0.0
Sources: Based on the RAIS, CAGED, and PME.
Note: Dashes indicate that no calculations were implemented.In addition to those arguments, there are also arguments that suggest the
informal sector may be indirectly aﬀected by the constitution through at
least two channels. First, changes in the formal sector tend to aﬀect the in-
formal sector through its eﬀects on overall labor market conditions, for in-
stance, as a result of its eﬀect on the unemployment rate. Second, changes
in the legislation may play a role in the bargaining process even in the in-
formal sector through their eﬀect on the notion of fair labor relation.
There also exists another reason why the informal sector quits, and very-
short spells may not be an ideal control group. Ideally, it is also necessary
that changes in the macroeconomic environment have identical impact on
the control and treatment groups. However, there is no theoretical or em-
pirical reason why the response of quits and layoﬀs, short and long spells,
and the formal and informal sectors to macroeconomic shocks should be
of the same magnitude. Due to these limitations we decided to analyze re-
sults from an alternative methodology.
5.4.5 Regression Analysis
The preceding empirical strategy requires data for only two periods in
time: a pre- and a post-1988 period. However, if data is available for a large
number of points in time and the macroeconomic changes can be charac-
terized by measurable indicators, then it is possible to obtain estimates of
the impact of the constitutional change and macroeconomic factors on
hazard rates through a regression analysis.
The procedure would essentially consist of regressing monthly estimates
(based on the PME) for the aggregated hazard rate on an indicator for the
constitutional change (i.e., an indicator that will have 0 as the value before
and 1 as the value after the constitutional change), on another indicator for
the group (the treatment group is associated with the 0 value whether the
control group is associated with 1), on a set of macroeconomic indicators
and interactions between the group indicator and each of the macroeco-
nomic indicators, and also on the constitution indicator.
(9) ht,i(x1, x2, c, r)    0   x’ 1t    1   x’ 2t    2    3   ct    4   gi
  x’ 1t    5   gi    6   gi   ct   r’ i    7   εti
x’ 1t is the transpose vector of values obtained for the four macroeconomic
indicators in period t: a) the GDP real growth rate; b) the degree of open-
ness as measured by the ratio between total trade (import plus exports) and
the GDP; c) the inﬂation rate; and d) the volatility of the inﬂation rate as
measured by its temporal standard deviation. x’ 2t is a transpose vector of
time invariant explanatory variables other than the constitutional indica-
tor (ct). These variables are a linear time trend and monthly seasonal dum-
mies. Regional indicator (r’ i) and group indicator (gi) complement our
speciﬁcation. Finally, bold characters represent vector notation.
338 Ricardo Paes de Barros and Carlos Henrique CorseuilAccording to this framework the eﬀect of constitution on the treatment
group can be written as  3. The estimation of this eﬀect through regression
(b3) will be a valid procedure even if the control group is aﬀected by the
constitution or there are unbalanced macroeﬀects. On the other hand, the
procedure relies on the assumption that no other factor is related to hazard
rates besides those considered in the regression framework.21
This procedure was done considering each one of the alternatives for the
control group and for each interval in turn, except for the very-short spell
(this interval is never supposed to be aﬀected by the constitution, even
when it is part of the treatment group). The estimated coeﬃcients are re-
ported on the upper part of tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8. The values associated
with the constitutional indicator b3 are an alternative estimation for the
impact of the change in legislation on treatment groups’ turnover rates.
The regression, however, adds an important information namely the conﬁ-
dence of the estimates.
We can see that from the nine alternative estimates of b3 (three employ-
ment spells multiplied by three controls), four are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. These signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are those associated with short and
long employment spells when either very-short spell or quit are used as
control. Among these four results we have two negative and two positive
estimates. The positive results correspond to those estimated for workers
whose employment spell is long, while negative results correspond to those
estimated for workers whose employment spell is short. This last result is
consistent with ﬁndings in the last section.
The next step is the analysis of which control satisﬁes the necessary con-
ditions stipulated for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimators. Despite the fact
that the test is based on a regression framework, the conditions are not
necessary for the regression estimators of the constitutional eﬀects.
As already mentioned, for a control group to be considered valid, it must
satisfy two properties. First, it must not be aﬀected by the constitutional
change. Second, macroeconomic changes must have the same impact on
the treatment and the control groups. As we described in section 5.4.4,
those properties may not be valid for the control groups considered in this
study. However, both properties are testable under the assumption that we
can have explicit control for macroeconomic changes.
If the ﬁrst property is valid (i.e., the constitutional change had no eﬀect
on the control group), then the expected value for the hazard rates associ-
ated with the control group should be equal for periods before and after the
constitutional change. It can be precisely written as
Z   E(ht,i\gi   1, ct   1)   E(ht,i\gi   1, ct   0),
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21. In fact, the regression would still produce valid results if those omitted factors aﬀect in
the same way in both groups and the control is not aﬀected by the constitution. In this case










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.where according to (9) we can see that22
Z    3    6.
Our statistic test will be based on the analogous estimated coeﬃcients,
b3   b6,
where we denoted as bthe estimations of the true  coeﬃcients. So we have
that if the constitutional change did not aﬀect the control group, the sum
of the coeﬃcient on the indicator for the constitutional change and the co-
eﬃcient on the interaction between the constitution and group indicators
must be zero.
If the second property is valid (i.e., macroeconomic changes have the
same eﬀect on the control and treatment groups), then the expected value
for the eﬀect of the macroeconomic indicators on the hazard rates associ-


















i  \gi   0 ,
which is equivalent to see if  5   0.23
Once more we will base our statistic tests on the analogous vector of es-
timated coeﬃcients (b5) to see if each of the elements of this vector is null
(b1
5   b2
5   b3
5   b4
5   0). This test is diﬀerent when we consider quit as the
control. In this case we test if the eﬀect of macroeconomic changes for both



















i  \gi   0 ,
which is equivalent to see if – 5   2 1.
The p-value related to both statistics tests mentioned previously, for each
of the nine regressions, is shown on the bottom part of tables 5.6, 5.7, and
5.8. The results related to whether the control was aﬀected by the constitu-
tion are mostly in accordance with the null hypothesis of a null eﬀect. Only
one of the nine alternative combinations of control groups and employ-
ment spells considered presents any evidence that it was aﬀected by the
constitution—the informal workers whose duration spells are long. So
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22. E(ht,i\gi   1, ct   1)    0   E(x’ 1i    1\gi   1, ct   1)   E(x’ 2t    2\gi   1, ct   1)    3  
 4   E(x’ 1t    5\gi   1, ct   1)    6 and E(ht,i\gi   1, ct   0)    0   E(x’ 2t    1\gi   1, ct   1)  
E(x’ 2t    2\gi   1, ct   1)    4   E(x’ 1t    5\gi   1, ct   1).















,i   \gi   0     1.there is almost no evidence of any eﬀect of the constitution change on the
informal sector, the very-short employment spell, or quitting behavior.
However, when we consider whether the groups were equally aﬀected by
factors other than the constitution, the results are not so favorable. This
hypothesis (considering the sign correction) was rejected among quit and
dismissal separations. It was not rejected for the formal and informal par-
tition, and for the very-short and other spells it was rejected only for those
workers whose employment spell was long.
So the best alternative to implementing the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
methodology requires the use of the very-short spell or the informal sector
as control groups restricted to short and not-so-short employment spells.
5.5 Final Considerations
This study is an attempt to estimate the impact on the Brazilian labor
market performance due to the 1988 constitutional change. As a result of
this change, the compensation for dismissals without just cause increased
fourfold. We investigate the impact of these changes on the parameters of
the demand for labor and on hazard rates. If the constitutional change had
a major impact, we should observe an important change in labor demand
parameters and hazard rates around 1988.
Figures 5.2 and 5.3, however, provide no evidence at all that the consti-
tutional change had any eﬀect on labor demand parameters. Nevertheless,
these ﬁgures reveal considerable temporal ﬂuctuations in the coeﬃcients
that could be explained by macroeconomic events. To verify this possibil-
ity, we regress our monthly estimates for the parameters of the demand
function on an indicator for the constitution change and a series of macro-
economic indicators. The results presented in tables 5.2 and 5.3 reveal that
even when taking into account macroeconomic variables, we still found no
evidence that the 1988 constitution had any eﬀect on the demand for labor.
Naturally, the fact that we were unable to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects does not
necessarily imply that they do not exist. Our results are limited by the rich-
ness and quality of our data and economic models. Much further research
is still necessary to reach a deﬁnite conclusion that labor demand dynam-
ics were not very responsive to this constitutional change.
The estimations using hazard rates show ambiguous results. According
to diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology (applied to appropriated controls),
this turnover measure has declined for short employment spells (three to
six months) but seems to have increased for not-so-short employment
spells (six to twelve months). Regression analysis also provides ambiguous
results because it points to a decline for hazard rates associated with short
spells and an increase for long spells (twelve to twenty-four months).
Resuming, separation rates have decreased after the constitutional
changes for the short employment spell and increased for longer spells,
while parameters related to speed of adjustment and wage elasticity of em-
344 Ricardo Paes de Barros and Carlos Henrique Corseuilployment have not changed. These facts may be consistent if the movements
registered to separations in opposite directions cancel each other, keeping
aggregate turnover and, consequently, the parameter mentioned un-
changed.
There is a possible explanation for the movements on separation driven
by a combination of dismissals and quits movements. On one hand, ﬁrms
might become more reluctant to ﬁre a worker that did not ﬁt the job
oﬀered. They may then give more chances to see the worker perform ac-
cording to what is expected. On the other hand, the accumulated amount
of money on FGTS became more attractive to workers, and this attrac-
tiveness increases with the employment spell. Hence, workers may have be-
come more active in proposing a collusion with ﬁrms that he quits, pre-
tending a ﬁring and then having access to the fund. So if there is a
correspondence between the three- to six-month employment spell and the
time at which the ﬁrm became reluctant, and between longer employment
spells and the time at which worker tries the collusion, the results should be
those presented.
Appendix A
The Complete Derivation of the Structural Model 
for Labor Demand Shown in Section 5.2.1
In order to obtain an explicit solution to this problem of maximization, we
mentioned the introduction of a series of simplifying assumptions. These
assumptions are described below.
First, we assume that the revenue function is separable in the following
sense:
R(ni(t), pi(t),  (t),  i(t))   F(ni(t),  1(t))   [G(pi(t),  2(t))    i(t)]ni(t)
Under this assumption, the Euler equation associated with maximizing
equation (1) is given by24
F n(ni(t),  1(t))   G(pi(t),  2(t))    i(t)    (t)wi(t)   C ( ni(t),  (t)) 
   Et{C ( ni(t   1),  (t   1))}   0.
We further simplify this model by assuming that the revenue function is
linear-quadratic and the adjustment cost is quadratic; that is, we assume
that
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24. We use F n and C  to denote the derivatives of the F and ct functions in relation to their
ﬁrst arguments.and






 1(t)   ( 11(t),  12(t)).
Furthermore, we assume that all ﬁrms in the same sector undergo the
same price of inputs. As a result,




where Iis indicates whether ﬁrm i belongs to sector s, that is, Iis   1 if ﬁrm i
belongs to sector s and Iis   0 otherwise. Under these additional assump-
tions the Euler equation becomes
  11(t)    i(t)  ∑
m
s 1
ϕs(t)Iis    (t)wi(t)     12(t)ni(t)    (t) ni(t) 
     (t){Et[ni(t   1)]   ni(t)}   0.
Under the assumption that parameters  12(t) and  (t) are time invariant
and that
Et  11(t   1)    i(t   1)  ∑
m
s 1
ϕs(t   1)Iis    (t   1)wi(t   1) 
   11(t)    i(t)  ∑
m
s 1
ϕs(t)Iis    (t)wi(t) ,
the solution of this equation is given by






   11(t)    i(t)  ∑
m
s 1
ϕs(t)Iis    (t)wi(t) 
as mentioned in section 5.2.1, where   is implicitly deﬁned by
 12   (1    )(1      ) .
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Aggregate Hazard Rates and Transition Intensities Based 
on Employment Surveys, Steady-State Assumption, and
Stochastic Independence of Employment and
Unemployment Spells
Let pt(d, u) represent the probability that a worker, whose previous job
lasted d months and who is unemployed at time t for u months, will not
leave the unemployment pool next month. Then, at each moment in time
t, the number of unemployed workers whose previous jobs last d months,
Ut(d), is given by
Ut(d)  ∑
t
s    Ms(d)  
t 1
r s
pr(d, r   s)  .
The steady state assumption implies that the time subscripts are not rel-
evant. Thus, in particular, this equation can be rewritten as
U(d)   M(d) ∑
 
s      
 
r s
p(d, r   s)  .
Moreover, the stochastic independence of the duration of the employ-
ment and unemployment spells implies that
p(d, r   s)    (r   s).
Therefore,
U(d)   M(d)∑
 
s      
 
r s




s      
 
r s
 (r   s  .
Hence, we have established the useful result that at each moment in time
the number of unemployed workers whose previous jobs lasted d months,
Ut(d), is proportional to the number of employment spells of duration d
ending at time t, Mt(d).
From steady-state assumption it is possible to write the hazard rate as a
function of the separations as shown in the following expression:
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where we used the assumption that all employment spells have ﬁnite dura-







   
 Nt(0)  ∑s 0
d 1 Mt(s) 




Therefore, the hazard rate can be obtained from the data on unemployed
workers by
ht(d)    .
If it is also assumed that the duration of the unemployment spell is inde-
pendent of whether the previous employment spell ended by a quit or dis-




lt(d)   ,
where Ut
q(d) is the number of unemployed workers at time t whose previ-
ous job lasted dmonths and ended in a quit, and Ul
t(d) is the number of un-
employed workers at time twhose previous jobs lasted dmonths and ended
in a dismissal.
We take similar steps to write the aggregate hazard rates that can be writ-
ten as
Hti  
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Ut(d)   ΛM(d),
the aggregated hazard rate can be approximated by the following equation:
Hti ≈
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